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The Impact of Collective Bargaining:
Illusion or Reality?
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews a significant body of evidence regarding the impact
of trade unionism on economic performance and seeks to evaluate antithetical
views regarding whether estimated differences between union and nonunion
workers and firms represent: illusions created by poor experiments, real
effects explicable solely in price—theoretic terms, or real effects which
reflect the non wage—related dimensions of trade unions. The review yields
conclusions on both the substantive questions at hand and the methodologies
which have been used to address their validity.
With respect to the illusion/reality debate, the preponderance of
extant evidence indicates that union effects on a wide variety of economic
variables estimated with cross—sectional data are real. Moreover, since
the effects of unions on nonwage outcomes generally come from models which
hold fixed the level of wages and variables affected by wages, the evidence
supports the view that unions do much more than simply raise wages as an
economic monopolist. While, in this study, we do not examine interpretations
of these nonwage effects, the effects represent an empirical foundation
for the "institutional" view of unionism, which is described in Section I.
With respect to methods for evaluating the quality of standard cross—
sectional experiments, some techniques appear more useful than others.
In particular, we find that sensitivity analyses of single—equation results
and longitudinal experiments provide valuable checks on cross—sectional
findings while multiple—equations approaches produce results which are
much too unstable to help resolve the questions of concern.
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(617) 495—4950 (617) 495—4209In recent years there has been an outpouring ofempirical studies on
the impact of collective bargaining on theeconomy. While many of these
analyses focus on the traditional question ofwage determination under
unionism, considerable effort has also been devoted toestimating the
effect of the institution on other market outcomes. Asa result of this
work we have a large body of new evidenceregarding differences between
union and nonunion workers and union and nonunionenterprises along many
dimensions.
Can the observed union/nonunion differences beexplained primarily
in terms of preunjon characteristics of firmsor individuals? Is it
that all union/nonunion differences arise only because of the"union wage
effect" and are observed only when one or moreprice—theoretic responses
to this effect are being ignored? Or can it be thatunions have important
effects on the performance of our economicsystem through routes ignored
in standard price theory?
There are a number of different positions on whether unioneffects are
real or illusory. One belief is that theapparent union/nonunion differences
are illusory because of the way trade unions were superimposedon various
groupings of establishments or individuals. A second view is that unions
have real effects on economic performance, but that all ofthese effects
operate through price—theoretic routes; any effects whichappear to be
—1—inexplicable in termsofstandard price theory are taken as illusory.
Finally, there is the perception that unions influenceoutcomes through
institutional channels and, in so doing, haveimportant real nonwage
effects on our economy.
The preiinion characteristics belief thatapparent union/nonunion
differences are illusory seems to be heldprimarily by those who see the
world as close enough to satisfying theconditions of perfect competition
that, in the short run, unions are more of anepiphenomenon than a
substantive force.1 While it is unlikely thatanyone really believes that
every apparent union effect is an apparition, thepreunion characteristics
view lies behind many attempts to explainaway particular results suggesting
that unions have meaningful economicimpacts.
Those whose vision of what unions docomes from standard price theory
tend to focus on what we have elsewhere called the"monopoly face" of
unionism and believe that every real effect ofunions works through price—
theoretic channels.2Thus, these individuals tend to limit their focus to the size
and ramifications of "the unionwage effect," treating any estimated union
effect which cannot be rationalized in terms ofa price—theoretic response
to the wage effect as illusory, that is, asreflecting the poor quality of
the experiment at hand.
Those in the industrial relations tradition believethat unionism
influences outcomes primarily through whatare often labelled "institutional
channels" (the "collective voice/institutionalresponse face" in our earlier
work). While this group accepts the existence ofimportant real price—
theoretic union effects, it believes in the.reality of non price—theoretic
—2--effects as well. In fact, theprimary concern of researchers with. an
industrial relations world view is withthe flonwage effects of collective
bargaining.
This paper examines thearguments and empirical evidence concerning
whether UflOfl/flOflUfliOfl differencesrepresent illusion or reality, defined
in accordance with either theprice—theoretic or institutional views. In
it we seek to determine theextent to which the Ufliofl/flOflUfliofl differences
found in myriad market outcomesare:(1) illusory, explicable in terms of
th degree of unionismamong workers or firms with innately different
characteristjcs (2) real, working throughprice—theoretic routes of impact;
and (3) real, working through Institutionalroutes of impact.
While we recognize that to someextent we have set up artificial polar
cases, and that no sensible researcher would be
expected to rely solely on
any one of the views for explaining all union/nonunion
differences, we
believe that the differences notedpermeate much of the recent literature on
unionism and that the "ideal types"provide a fruitful guide to understanding
efforts to determine what unions in factdo.
a
The paper is divided into four sections.Section I summarizes the recent
empirical findings about union/nonunion differenceson which the interpretative
debate focuses. The second sectionlays out the theoretical and econometric
explanations of the observed Ufljofl/flOflUfljOfldifferences that have been put
forth by the various camps inillusion/reality debates. Section III provides
a summary of the results of new studies whichcan be used to assess whether
—3—the effects set out in Section Iare best interpreted as illusory,rea1
for price—theoreticreasons, or real for reasons that can be called
"institutiona1'! The final sectionpresents a brief summary of our findings.
By way of anticipation, we reach two mainConclusions. First, unions
and collective bargaining have substantialreal effects on diverse
economic outcomes; Union/nonunion differencesappear to reflect much more
than the poor quality of oureconometric "experiments." Second,many of the
real union effects are the result ofinstitutional factors, whichmany
economists have neglected in recentyears; the price—theoretic view of
reality seems to be much too narrow.
I. The Evidence In Question
It is important at the outset tolay out the union/nonunion differences
about which illusion/reality
interpretative questions have arisen.
Accordingly, this section briefly suinmariaes theresults of recent research
concerning the impact of unionism on certainkey aspects of the labor
exchange. As a guide to the discussion, Table Igives the central findings
of these studies categorizedby the following substantive issues:
compensation; internal and external mobility; work rulesand environment;
and inputs, productivity, and profits. Thereader will notice that our set of
issues is not exhaustive. We have, inparticular, neglected such important
topics as the internal operation ofunions, strikes, and the survival of
the organization itself, inpart because these topics do not lend themselves
to the union/nonunion comparisons which formthe bulk of the research on
the topics in the table. Inaddition, we concentrate exclusively on the







All else (measurable) thesame, union!
nonunion hourly wage differential is
between 10% and 20%.
All else the same, union/nonunion
hourly fringe differential is between
20% and 30%. The fringe share of
compensation is higher at a given
level of compensation.
Wage inequality is much lower among
union members than among comparable
nonrnembersand totaFwage dipersion
appears to be lowered by u!lionisoi.
Wage differentials between workers
who are different in terms ofrace,
age, service, skill 1evel,and
education appear to be lower under
cnhiQCtjvbargaining.
Union wages are less responsive to
labor market conditions than nonunion
wages.
Other things equal, the union
compensation advantage is higher the
greater the percent of a market's
workers who are organized. The
effects of market concentration
wage differentials is unclear.
differentials appear to be very
in some regulated markets. They
appear to decline as firm size
increases.
Seniority independent of productivity
is rewarded substantially more in
promotion decisions among union members
than among otherwise comparable
nonunion employees.
Ashenfelter (1976), Free-
man & Medoff (forthcoming a),
Lewis (1980), Mellow (l981a),
Oaxaca (1975), Welch (1980).
Duncan (1976), Freeman (1981),
Goldstein & Pauly (1976),
Leigh (1979), Solnick (1978),
Viscusi (1980).
Freeman (l980c), Hyclak (1979—
1980), Plotnick (1981).
Ashenfelter (1976), Bloch &
Kuskin (1978), Johnson &
Youmans (1971), Kiefer &
Smith (1977), Leigh (1978),





Lewis (1963), Medoff (1979),
Mitchell (1980a, 1980b),
Parson (1968), Raisian (1979).
Dalton & Ford (1977),
Donsimoni (1978), Ehrenberg
(1979), Freeman & Medoff
(forthcoming a), Hayden (1977),
Hendricks (1975), Kahn (1978),
Kochan (1980), Lee (1978),
Mellow (l981b), Weiss (1966).
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—5—The quit rate Is much lower for
unionized workers than for similar
workers who are nonunion.
There is much more cyclical labor
adjustment through temporary layoffs
in unionized manufacturing firms than
in otherwise comparable firms that
are nonunion.
Terminations are more likely to beon
a last—in—first_out basisamong union
employees, ceteris paribus.
There are important differences in the
prevalence and nature of various rules
in union and nonunion settings, such
as those stipulating the role of
company service and the way grievances
are to be handled. Union work places
appear to be run more by rules, with
more rigidity in the scheduling of
hours and less worker flexibility.
Management in unionized cement firms
appears to be more professional (less.
paternalistic or authoritarian), more
standards oriented, and more in touch
with work performance thanmanagement
in similar nonunion firms.
Management in unionized manufacturing
firms appears less able to substitute
nonproduction worker hours for
production worker hours, but seems no
less able to substitute capital for
production labor than similarly
situated nonunion management.
The stated level of overall job
satisfaction is lower, but thewage
Blau & Kahn (1981), Block
(l978a), Farber (OLS Results
1979), Freeman (1976, l980a,
1980b), Kahn (1977), Leigh
(1979).
Blau & Kahn (1981), Medoff
(1979).
Blau & Kahn (1981), Medoff
& Abraham (l98la, 198lb).
Freeman, (l980a), Kochan &
Bloch (1977), Kochan &
H.elfman (1979), Medoff &
Abraham (1981b).
Freeman & Medoff (forthcoming
b).
Borjas (1979), Freeman (1976,
l978a), Kochan & Helfman
(1979), Mandelbaum (1980).
Table 1
RECENT EVIDENCE ON UNION/NONUNIONDIFFERENCES BASED ON CROSS-SECTIONDATA


























Unionized workers state thatthey are
more satisfied with. their wages and
fringes, less satisfied with their
supervision, and less satisfied with.
their working conditions than nonunion
workers. The extent to which stated
job security grows with. tenure. is
substantially greater under unionism.
While the probability of viewing
promotions as faIr declines with.
service among nonunion employees, it
increases among union members.
Unionize.d firms in manufacturing,
construction, and underground
bituminous coal appear to have higher
capital—labor ratios than similar
nonunion enterprises.
In manufacturing and construction and
in the underground bituminous, coal
industry in nonturbulent times.,
unionized enterprises appear to have
greater productivity than those that
are nonunion, all else equal. In
underground coal, productivity
appeared to be lower under unionism in
- turbulentyears around 1975.
nonunion manufacturing firms,
of profit per unit of capital
to be lower under unionIsm.
Wages or total compensation was heldconstant in generating this finding.
Variables reflecting price—theoreticresponses were held constant as well as
possible in generating this finding.
—7—
Table 1
RECENT EVIDENCE ON UNION/NONUNION DIFFERENCES
BASED ON CROSS—SECTIONAL DATA
Variable.
. Finding
gain required to induce a job. change
is higher for union members than for












Other things equal, workers in
unionized firmstendto have more
"human capitalj'
Duncan & Stafford (19R1).
Freeman & Nedoff (1982),
Kochan. & He1fmanl979)
Viscusi (1980).
Allen (1979), Brown &
Nedoff (1978), Farber (1979),
Frantz (1976), Kahn (1979),
Kalachek & Raines (1980).
Allen (.1979), Brown &
Medoff (1978), Clark (1980b),
Connerton & Freeman & Medoff
(.1979), Frantz (1976).
Allen (1979), Brown & Nedoff.
(1978), Clark (l980a).,..
Connerton & Freeman & Medoff
(1979), Frantz (1976)






While profit.per unit of sales appears
to be the same in similar union and
the rate
appears.issues is all—encompassing and whileour listing of relevant references is
undoubtedly incomplete, we believe that thetable provides a reasonably
accurate picture of the empirical results inquestion.
Compensation
The first and probably still the most widely studiedissue is the
differential between union and nonunionwages. The early literature on this
differential was summarized in Lewis'sinfluential 1963 book, Unionism
and Relative Wages in the UnitedStates. Since the publication of Lewis's
book, a number of new sources of
individual—level data (such as the
May Current Population Survey) whichpermit estimation of the wage effect
have become available. With.micro—data of this kind, it is possibleto
compare the wages of union and nonunion workerswith similar demographic
characteristics who are also in thesame detailed industry and/or occupation.
As Johnson (1975) has reviewedsome of this work, our summary will be brief.
The post—Lewis micro—data estimates(derived with Ordinary Least Squares(OLS))
have generally foundwage differentials noticeably above the 10 to 15
percent range given inLewis's book. However, theanalyses that have looked
within more detailed cells,especially those with industry as a dimension,
have tended to yield estimated differentialsnear the top end of the 10 to
15 percent range. This makesvery good sense given that the studies
summarized by Lewis normally examineda very narrowly defined group of
workers. A comparison of the unionwage effect by groups suggests larger
impacts for black as opposedtowhitemen, for blue—collar as opposed to
white—collar workers, foryounger as opposed to older employees, and for
the less as opposed to the more educated. Inaddition, substantial differences
have been noted in the size of thedifferential by industry.
—8--Another form of data which has beenused in recent studies pertainsto
individual establishments. These data(from surveys such as theEmployer
Expenditures for Employee CompensationSurvey (EEC)) permit the estimation
of wage effects for production
or nonproduction workers among firms of the
same size within the same 3—digit Standard IndustrialClassification
(SIC) industry. Estimates using thesedata are quantitatively closer to
those of Lewis, yielding union/nonuniondifferences of '10 percent or so.
All told, with rareexception, recent studies confirm the existence ofa
sizeable union/nonunionwage differential.
While a tremendous amount of effortwas devoted in the past to studying
union/nonunion differentials inwage rates, very little attention was devoted
to analyzing union/nonunion differentialsin fringe benefits. With the
passage of time, this allocation of resources has becomeless defensible
since the share of total
compensation associated with voluntary fringes has
been growing rapidly. In contrastto Rice's 1966 cross—industry analysis,
which found no union effecton fringes, the recent studies cited in Table 1
have demonstrated that the "unionfringe effect" is bigger, in percentage
terms, than the "union wage effect' Data fromthe 1968, 1970,and 1972 EEC
indicate, for example, that holding constant thecharacteristics in
employees' establishments, blue—collar workerscovered by collective
bargaining received fringe benefits thatwere about 28 to 36 percent higher
than those of blue—collar workers whowere not covered (compared to a
union wage advantage of 8 to 15percent). For workers receiving the same
total compensation per hour, thefringe share of labor cost was markedly
higher in the union setting (Freeman
(1981)). Looking at separate fringes, the largest
union/nonunion percentage differentialson a per hour basis are for
—9—pensions, life, accident and healthInsurance, and vacation pay.
Onekeyquestion to ask about the union/nonunion
wage differentials is,
"how do they vary acrosssettings?" Recent empirical work on thissubject
has been based on the notion that
union wage gains will be high wherethe
elasticity of demand for labor, and hencethe cost of increased relative
wages in terms of lost members, is low. The
evidence that, at least in
the manufacturing andconstruction sectors of oureconomy, union wages but
not flOfluflion wages grow with the fractionorganized in the relevant product
market is consistent with thisclaim; this is because a highpercentage
organized is likely to be associated witha low demand elasticity for
union products and thus a low demandelasticity for union members. Other
work has concentrated on the effectof market regulation on the unionwage
effect. Ehrenberg (1979)presents evidence consistent with the claim that
union wages are raised by theregulation of public utilities. Hayden (1977)
argues that the sizeable impact of unionism
on trucker wages (40 percent or
so) Is attributable both to ICCregulation of the sector and to the National
Master Freight Agreement, whichcreated industry—wide bargaining.
Since their inception, unions inour country have been concerned with
the structure as well as the levelof wage rates. The practice whichmost
exemplifies unions' efforts on this front is thelong standing policy of
pushing for "standard rates"; that is, uniformrates for comparable workers
across establishments and for givenoccupational classes within establishments.
Estimates presented in Freeman (l980c)show that, for blue—collar workers,
wage inequality is substantially loweramong union members than among similar
nonmemijers., Consistent with this, estimatesof separate wage equations
—10—for union and nonunion workers havefound that virtually all standardwage—
determining variables are associated with smallerearnings differentials
under unionism. Moreover, unionwage policies appear to contribute to the
equalization of wages by decreasing thedifferential between covered blue—
collar workers andnoncovered white—collarworkers. If we add the apparent
decrease in inequality due towage standardization and the apparent decrease
due to reduction in the white—collar/blue.collar
differential to the apparent
increase due to the greater
wages of blue—collar union workers, we find that the
apparent net effect OUnionism is
to reduce total wage ineouality.Evidence on
inequality of earnings across standard metropolitonstatistical areas (SMSA's)
and states and over time also showsa negative relationship between unionism
and dispersion in pay. In short, itappears that the structure of wages in
the United States has been compressedby the wage policies of organized labor.
Finally, with respect to wage adjustments undervarying economic
conditions, recent analyses of cyclical variation inwage rates have confirmed
the earlier finding of Lewis that theunion/nonunion wage differential has
tended to be greater during economicdownturns,whichsuggests that the
reduction in (the growth of) realwage rates in response to a reduction in
product demand is smaller under trade unions.Interestingly, the work of
Johnson (1981) and Mitchell (l981a) andan analysis of Current Wage Develop-
ments establishment—level datasuggest that the union wage effect grew
substantially during the l970's to a point where it isroughly comparable
to its level in the l930's.
Internaland ExternalMobi]4y
The new work on unionism has, as notedearlier, expanded the set of
—11—Outcomes under study. One of themost important topicsreceiving attention
has been the impact ofunionism on the internal and
external mobility of
employees.
To evaluate the effects ofunionism on firms' employmentpolicies (the
awarding of promotions, the
ordering of layoffs, etc. )itis necessary to
have knowledge of whatis actually happening insideboth union and nonunion
firms. Survey evidencecollected by and discussed inMedoff and Abraham (l980b,
l98la, l981b) and recentcase studies have provided relevantinformation
concerning the role of seniority
independent of performance in firms'promotion
and termination decisions.With respect to promotions,the survey data
reveal that whereas 68percent of private sector unionizedemployees outside
of agriculture andconstruction work in settings where
senior employees are
favored substantially whenpromotion decisions are made,only 40 percent of
the nonunion work force is
employed in such settings. When theanalysis is
restricted to hourlyemployees, the estimates of concernare 68 percent for
union members and 53percent for the nonunion labor force. Regressionswith
the survey datawbich includecontrols for firm size, industrialsector, and
geographic region yield differencessimilar to those just given.Moreover,
case studies of a number of U.S.firms tell the samestory: company service
counts more in promotion decisionsin union settings.
One of the essential tenetsof the collective voice/institutional
response model is that among workers
receiving the same pay, unions reduce
employee turnover and associated
costs by offering 'voice" asan alternative
to "exit." Recent evidence
using newly available informationon the job
changes of thousands of individualsand Oflindustry—levelturnover rates
—12—shows that with diverse factors (includingwages) held constant, unionized
workers do have substantially lower quit rates thannonunion workers who are
comparable in other respects. The reduction in quits and theaccoinpanying
increase in tenure appear to be as substantial for blacksas for whites and
greater for older than for younger workers.
With less ability to reduce (the growthof) real wage rates and with
lower quit rates, unionized firmscan be expected to make greater use of
other adjustment mechanisms, suchas average hour reductions and layoffs.
Both establishment_level and individual—leveldata sets demonstrate that
temporary layoffs and recalls are a more important form of laboradjustment
in unionized manufacturing firms than inotherwise comparable firms that
are nonunion. Moreover, temporary layoffs tend to beused instead of
average hours reductions to a greater extent under unionism.Hence, it
appears that the layoff/recall syndrome which has received muchrecent
attention is, for the most part, a unionizedmanufacturing (in particular,
durables) phenomenon.
With respect to the order of layoffs, evidence fromthe seniority
survey just cited reveals that among those who had witnessed work force
reductions rules protecting senior workersagainst being permanently laid
off before their junior co—workersare more prevalent and stronger under
trade unions. For hourly employees, 95percent of the responses pertaining
to groups covered by collective bargaining indicatedthat seniority in and
of itself receives substantial weight intermination decisions, compared to
70 percent of the responses pertaining tononcovered groups. As for
flstrengthtt 68 percent of the survey responsespertaining to unionized
hourly employees stated that a senior worker wouldnever be involuntarily
terminated before a junior worker, whereas only 28percent of the responses
—13—pertaining to nonunion hourly employees stated that this isso. These
survey results could not be explained in terms ofcompany characteristics
and are consistent with the findings of Blau and Kahn(1981) who used
individual—level data.
Work Rules and Environment
Other personnel practices and procedures alsoappear to be affected
by the presence of unionism. In Clark's (1980a, 1980b)study of six cement
firms which were recently unionized,management practices appear to have
changed significantly with the coming of a union, in directions whichcan be
labelled "productivity oriented." These observationsgain credence from
the fact that they are similar to those of SumnerSlichter, James Heals and
E. Robert Livernagh, who conducted myriadcase studies concerning the
relationship between unionism and management behavior for theirclassic
1960 opus, The ]Irnpact of CollectiveBargaininonManagement. It should
be noted that, with evidence of the type which has beencollected,
it is difficult to infer whether managers were moved fromnon cost—
minimizing behavior to cost—minimizing behavior or whether the trpe
of behavior which is cost—minimizing is different in union and in
nonunion environments.
It would seem reasonable, given what isbelieved about the objective
function of the typical union, to find lessmanagement flexibility in
unionized establishments than in otherwisecomparable establishments that are
nonunion. Consistent with this view, evidence drawnprimarily from the
l972 Census of Manufactur and theEEC show that within U.S. manufacturing
—14—the ease of substitution for
production labor, particularly substitution
of nonproduction for productionlabor, is lower under trade unionism.However,
it should be mentioned that the limitedevidence does not indicate that
unionism is associated with a lowerelasticity of substitution between labor
and capital and thus with whatevertechnological change is embodied in new
capital.
Workers 'Assessmentof Jobs
Several recent studies examining theimpact of unionism on the stated
job satisfaction of workers have found union workersexpressing less satis-
faction, or in some instances no moresatisfaction, with their jobs than
similar nonunion workers, even whencompensation is not held constant. At
the same time, however, union membersare also more likely to state that
they are "unwilling to change jobs underany circumstance" or "would never
consider moving to a new job" than are their "moresatisfied" nonunion
counterparts, even when the wage is fixed. One interpretationof these
results is that the collective voice of unionismprovides workers with a
channel for expressing their preferencesto management and that this in-
creases their willingness to complain about undesirableconditions.
Evidence has also been accumulatedconcerning workers' stated satisfaction
\ withparticular aspects of their jobs. Some ofthe findings most relevant to
the discussion at hand are: (1)union members are much more likely tostate
that they are happy with theirwages and fringes than are otherwise comparable
nonunion employees; (2) thereappears to be a strong tendency for unionized
workers to state they are less happy withtheir supervisors and have worse
relations with them; (3) there isa tendency for unionized workers toreport
their physical work conditionsare less desirable than those reported by
—15—unionized workers; (4) the extent to whichstated job security grows with
tenure is substantially greater underunionism; and (5) while the probability
of viewing promotions as fair isnegatively related to seniority in nonunion
settings, it is positively related to seniority underunionism.
Inputs, Productivityand Profits
When unions raise wages or otherwise alterlabor costs, enterprises can
be expected to change factor inputs andmodes of organization in suchways
as to raise the marginal revenue product of laborup to the point where it
equals the new marginal cost of labor. Two of themost important ways in
which firms could potentially do thisare to hire "higher quality" workers
and to increase their capital/labor ratios.Evidencehas been offered showing
that blue—collar union workers doin fact have somewhat more "huma capital"
than similar nonunion workers. WithMay CPS data for 1973—1975, blue—collar
union members are found to be three to fouryears older than otherwise
comparable nonunion blue—collar workers, and to haveslightly more education.
Separate wage equations for males and females, whichdifferentiate workers
by schooling, age, and region, lead to the conclusionthat unionized
production labor has about 6 percent more "humancapital" within 2—digit
manufacturing industries (Brown and Medoff (1978)). It shouldbe
noted, however, that an index of labor quality basedon weights from wage
regressions is at best only a crude approximation toan index based on "true"
productivity weights, as is implied by evidence thata substantial fraction
of seniority/earnings differentialscannot be explained by seniority!
productivity differentials Nedoff (1977) and Medoff and Abraham(1980a, l981a)).
Moreover, it should be recognized that indices of thesort being discussed
ignore potentially very important, but notmeasured, worker characteristics.
There have been a number of recent studies whichhave attempted to
—16—isolate "as well as is possible withexisting data" the effect of trade
unionism on the productivity of otherwisecomparable workers utilizing the
same amount of capital. The Brown and Medoff (1978)study, based on 1972
state—by—industry data for U.S. manufacturing, found that unionized
enterprises had 24 percent higher productivity than otherwisecomparable
nonunion establishments within the same2—digit SIC industries. Studies
of particular manufacturing industries——woodenhousehold furniture and
cement——have also found a positive productivitydifferential. Allen reports
sizeable differences in construction,using a value output measure. His
result is supported by the findings of Mandelstaimn(1965), who avoided the
potential problems of measuring output in dollar termsby having union and
nonunion contractors cost out an identicalproject.
That unionism can be associated with loweras well as higher producti-
vity has been documented for the U.S. underground bituminouscoal sector,
where unionized mines were estimated to be 25percent more productive than
comparable nonunion mines in 1965, but. 20 percent lessproductive a decade
later. One potential explanation for the observedchange in union/nonunion
productivity differentials is that the "quality" of industrial relationsin
that sector appeared to change over time.
Some effort has been devoted to explaining theroutes underlying the
apparent union impact on productivity. One relevant finding is thatroughly
25 percent of the union/nonunionproductivity differential in the manufactur—
ing sector can be explained by the union/nonunion differentialin quit rates.
Other evidence suggests that a significantpiece of the union productivity
effect can be explained by the union/nonunion differentialin the quality
of management practices.
—17—The association of unionism and profitability has been examined
only recently, in part because, like labor quality and capital,profits
are an extremely difficult variable to measure. What the available
evidence does suggest is that while the gross profitmargin (profit
as a percentage of the value of output) is no different in unionized
firms than in similar nonunion firms, the rate of returnon capital
is lower in unionized settings. Thus, itappears that productivity
under unionism is not sufficiently greater thanproductivity in
nonunion settings to offset the higher compensation plus thehigher
capital intensity, which would be necessary if profitsper unit of
capital were to be left unaffected.
11. Conceptuai Explanations of the EstimatedDifferences
Consider the union/nonunion differences in economicoutcomes presented
in Table 1. How can each finding beexplained? Which conceptualization of
markets and unions is most consistent with the observeddifferences? How
can alternative theoretical perspectives be analyzedempirically?
In this section we examine thearguments underlying the three potential
explanations of union/nonunion differences set outat the beginning of the
paper: (1) the "preunion characteristics" explanation under which union
differences are "pure illusiory explicable bytheunique characteristics of
organized workersor firms; (2) the "price—theoretic"explanation, under which unions
increase the relative compensation of their membersthrough their monopoly
power, eliciting in turn certain price—theoretic responses which explain all
—18—other differences; (3) the "institutional response" explanation, under
which unions have, along with their price—theoretic effects, important
tlonwage effects.
The Preunion Characteristics Explanation
In many discussions of estimated associations betweenunionization and
other variables, we have heard that observedunion/nonunion differences only
reflect the ?reunion characteristics of workersor firms. As the column
headed "Potential Explanation" in Table 2indicates, the preunion character-
istics under discussion are work forcequality, the preference structures of
workers, firm quality, and the production functions offirms. As the table's
second column portrays, these preunion characteristicshave been offered as
explanations of virtually every union/nonunion differencehown in Table 1.
While not a necessary condition for theview, those who offer the preunion
characteristics explanation of union/nonunion differencesgenerally assume
that there are no excess profits or quasi—rents inthe economy and, hence,
that systematic differences inwages or other costaffecting factors among
competing establishments in the same product market cannot exist. Ifthey
did, the enterprise with higher (lower) costs would be drivenout of
business (dominate the market). Since observeddifferences cannot reflect
cost differences, tley must be offset bycounterbalancing forces in the
form of differences in (observed orunobserved) worker or enterprise
characterjsics. Under this view, the commonly observedunion wage
advantage would be attributed to unobservedaspects of labor or firm quality
or unobserved differences in work conditions, whichrequire compensating
differentials of the classic type; if union workersare paid more, then
—19—Table 2
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS OFOBSERVEDUNION/NONUNION DIFFERENCES
POTENTIAL EXPLANATION




Wage rates; fringes; wage dispersion;quit rates; producti-
vity.
Workers' tastes
Fringes; cyclical responsiveness ofwage rates; role of
seniority in promotions and terminations and otherrules;
quit rates; temporary layoffs; physicalworking coridi—
tions; job satisfaction.
Quality of firms
Wage rates; fringes; quit rates; certainrules; manage-
ment practices; management flexibility;productivity;
Profitability.
Firms' technologies







Wage rates; fringes; cyclical responsiveness ofwage rates;
temporary layoffs; rules; physical working conditions.
Postunion sorting Postunion quality of work force; postunioflworkers'
tastes (and, thus, the differences listed aboveunder
preunion quality of work force andiréunjânorker'
tastes),
Survival of firms
Postunjon quality of firms;; postunion firms' tech-
nologies (and, thus, the differences listed aboveunder pre—
union quality of firms and preunion. firms'technologies).
Fringes; wage dispersion; cyclical responsiveness of
wage rates; quit rates; role of seniority in promotions
and terminations and other rules;temporary layoffs;
physical working conditions; job satisfaction;management
practices; productivity; profitability.
More channels for
Quits; job satisfaction; productivity;profitability. complaints, suggestions, and
other relevant information




compensation quality of jobs
Cross—market union compensation differentials;producti-
vity; profitability.
Cross—market union compensation differentials,producti-
vity; profitability;
Institutional Resyonses
New means for preference
revelation and aggregation
—20--their pay "advantage" solely reflectscompensation for more human capital
or less desirable nonwage dimensions of thejob.
Column 2 in Table 2 reveals thefollowing logical problem with using
the preun,foncharacterjstiargument to explain a large number of union/
nonunion differences: in several instancesthe analysis leads to contradic-
tory statements about the direction of the differencesprior to unionization.
For example, one way of explaining lowerquit rates at unionized firms is
to posit that union workers quit less thannonunion workers at given wages
because they are not as potentiallyproductive in the outside market as
otherwise comparable nonunion employees.However, this runs counter to the
preunibn characteristics explanation ofhigher union wages and productivity,
that unionized workers are innately better.Similarly, if, with wages fixed,
unionized workers quit less, a logical deductionmight be that, for whatever
reason, unions happen to be located at better plants.However, this runs
counter to the compensating differentialexplanation of the union/nonunion
wage differential, that unionized work places areworse than those that are
nonunion. Because preunion. characteristicsarguments are usually invoked
to explain observed differences inoutcomes one at a time, these logical
problems have not received adequate considerationamong adherents of the
preunion characteristics view of the set ofobserved union/nonunion
differences.
The ;preunibrn characteristics analysisruns into a second logical
problem with respect to the mechanism by whIch unionizedworkers or firms
can be expected to have any particular set ofpn{hn characteristics. Put
most strongly, if unions have no real effectson economic variables, there
—21—is no reason to expect them to locateor survive among workers or firms with
any given characteristic. This suggests that,by itself,anexplanation of all
observed union/nonunion differences interms of differences in preunion-
characteristics of workers or firms isexceedingly tenuous; it relies on
post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments about the locus ofunionism. It could
be that unions happen to organizehigh wage workers or firms, low quit em-
ployees, high productivity firms, work places with badconditions, and so on,
without having any real economic effects.However, there is, as far as we
know, no mechanism that would produce sucha locus of organization under
the null hypothesis that unions haveno real effect on any of the specified
variables.
Finally, there are two questions which must be asked of thosewho hold
the prednion characteristics view of allobserved union/nonunion differences:
"If all union effects are illusory,why do workers join unions?" and "Why
do employers oppose them (inmany cases with vigor)?"
ThePrice_Tepr(p Face)Explanation
In the monopoly model of unionism, unionsare assumed to raise wages
above competitive levels in theorganized sector. This creates higher costs
of production in organized firms. Howcan these firms survive?
One possible answer to this question is that unionsorganize the
entire relevant product market so that unionizedfirms face no nonunion
competition. If production costs are higher for all establishmentsin a
sector, the sector's output and employment will be lower than in the
absence of unionism, but the sector will survive.
—22—Another possible explanation is based on the assertions thatproduct
markets are not perfectly competitive and/or that firms ina given industry
have different cost structures (for reasons unassociatedwith unionism), which
permit companies to make excess profits and/or quasi—rents. In thisworld,
even if labor costs per effective labor unit rose as a result ofunionism,
firms could remain in business. As long as the increased unitlabor costs
came at the expense of excess profits and/or quasi—rents, but not at the
expense of normal profits, the enterprises would not go out of business.
Thus, this view stresses the idea that unions are likely to survive where
we find limited entry possibilities for firms, where entry takes time, and/
or where some enterprises have cost advantages over their competitors.3
The price—theoretic arguments just given imply that unionsare likely
to be located where their gains induce small price—theoreticresponses in
the form of either factor or product market substitution;i.e., where the
demand elasticity for labor is relatively low. It is likely, inturn, that
the comparisons of union/nonunion differences overstate, to some extent at
least, the potential impact of unionism on currently unorganized labor, inasmuch as
the set of price—theoretic responses relevant to today'sunorganized are
likely to be larger than the responses relevant to those who became unionized
in the past.
While the monopoly modelof unionism sees union/nonunion differences
which are explicable in price—theoretic terms as real, there isone variant
of the model under which the differences border on being labelled "illusory."
Thisvariant relies heavily on the "postunion sorting" of workers with
different innate abilities and tastes. Itgrantsthe possibility that
—23—unions can cause wages to rise but thenadds that these increases will be
met by essentially costless offsettingresponses in labor quality or work
conditions. For the labor qualityresponse to accomplish the offset, the
elasticity of substitution between differentgroups of workers must be
infinite over the period ofconcern. If so, an initial union wage effect,
defined in terms of anaverage labor unit working at a work place with
average .noncoinpensation characteristics, will lead firmsto substitute
higher quality for lower quality labor untilthe entire initial wage effect
is eliminated, and thus willbring about a sorting of workers in terms of
their quality. For the work conditionsresponse to effect the offset, the
firm must be able costlessly to let workplace quality deteriorate. If so,
the firm would let work conditionsworsen until the entire wage advantage
has been "paid for" bypoorer nonwage job characteristics. In this world,
when the dust settles, the only realobserved differences between union and
otherwise comparable nonunion firms willbe a difference in the uncorrected
(for differences in labor quality and thequality of work conditions) wage
differential, a difference in work forcequality, a difference in the
quality of work conditions, and a difference inany ratio defined in terms
of non quality—corrected labor units.4
Analogous responses by employers can also turnapparent union nonwage
effects into a mere sorting of workersby tastes. Consider, for example,
what might happen if unions were to raisefringes relative to wages in an
establishment. Workers with strong preferences forfringes, who might be
expected to seek those fringes in their currentfirms, would seek employment
in the union sector. Unionized firmswould attract fringe lovers, and would
devote a larger share of eachcompensation dollar to fringe benefits than would
—24—other firms, even though theaggregate expenditures on fringes might be
unchanged in the economy.
In short, in this framework unionscan have real immediate effects;
but these effects are posited to erodeaway through essentially costless
adjustments so that any differences observedover a longer run might properly
becalled "illusory."
The Institutional Response Explanation
Economists in the industrial relations tradition viewthe observed
union/nonuniondifferences from yet another perspective: interms of
"institutional responses" to union—inducedchanges.
The institutional response explanation differsfrom those considered
earlier in that it is based on the premisethat, for a variety of reasons,
the economy differs from the Paretooptimal world in which only standard
price—theoretic responses are possible. Severalreasons are often cited
for such divergence between the real worldand the economic model. First,
while many firms (individuals) seek to maximizeprofits (utility), they do
not achieve the optimum in the relevant period.Second, there are important
public goods and externalities which are found,among other places, where
people work. Third, there are important barriers to exitand entry in external
and internal labor markets and other markets ofless immediate concern.
Fourth, there is imperfect information in internal and external labormarkets
and in other markets as well. Fifth, firmsmaking excess profits and
quasi—rents are found in many industries. Sixth,some firms (individuals)
may be satisfied with less than an optimum, as emphasized by Simon (1955)
—25—in his model of "satisficing" behavior. In various related guises this
view of the world has been the basis of a number of views about the labor
exchange, such as: the internal labor market view (Doeringer and Piore (1971)),
the X—efficiency view (Leibenstein l966)), the idiosyncratic exchange
view (Williamson, Wachter, and Harris (1975)), and the collective voice!
institutional response view. What is most important about these views is
that they suggest that understanding the effects of trade unions requires
analyses of, among other things, the internal operations of firms, relevant
organizational issues, the provision of various public goods at work places,
and the quality and quantity of information flows.
The belief that labor in internal and external labor markets is, at
least to some extent, immobile is very important to the institutional
response view. In a world where there is not perfect exit and entry in labor
markets and workers cannot express fully their preferences by "voting with
their feet," there are opportunities for unions to influence economic be-
havior through means not generally recognized in standard price—theoretic
analyses and possibly to increase efficiency and social welfare as well.
In light of the discussion of labor immobility, it should be noted that
a union can increase both the rate of compensation and the number of its
members if it organizes finns with monopsony power. While monopsony is
usually presented as an extremely rare event in labor economic texts —
"Todaywe have very few one company towns" ——thetendency for workers to
be tied to the same firm for many years (for whatever reasons) is consistent
with the belief that elements of monopsony are omnipresent. The point is
that as long as firms face upward sloping labor supply curves, which is
—26—quite likely given the costs to employees of switching jobs (embodied in
unvested pensions, rights accruing with seniority, etc.,) and to employers
of finding and training new employees, the firm can act like amonopsonist
(equating marginal revenue product with the marginal, as opposed to the
average, cost of labor). This creates a situation in which unionism can
increase employment and social welfare by raising wages (see Viscusi (1980)).
The Price—Theoretic/Institutional Debate Over What Is Real
Most researchers try to control for the potential price—theoretic
routes of union impact in estimating union/nonunion differences innonwage
variables. Hence, as indicated by the notes to Table 1, many of the union!
nonunion differences under discussion cannot be explained in terms of
measurable price—theoretic variables. For instance, the substantial union!
nonunion differential in quit probabilities exists even when individuals'
wages and fringes are held constant. Or to choose another example, the union!
nonunion producivity differentials discussed above were estimated with
models which controlled for labor quality and capital intensity.
Analysts in the industrial relations tradition interpret the existence
of significant union effects, above and beyond measured price—theoretic
routes, as real——reflecting the nature of the economy's basic institutions.
These individuals believe that the key task for research on trade unions
involves gaining a better understanding of the origins, operations, and
interactions of the institutions, since the non price—theoretic actions of
finns and unions matter greatly in determining economic performance.
Devotees of the standard price—theoretic model perceive the union!
—27—nonunion differences quite differently; they see these differencesas illusory——
the result of the poor quality of the empirical experiments whichcan be
conducted. In their eyes, nonwage union/nonunion differencesare only
observed because the relevant price—theoretic routes havenot been captured.
In sum, there is a clear andvery important split among those who
believe that unions have some important real impacts:one group
says that only the wage matters; the other says that while thewage matters,
it most certainly is not all that matters.
From the Conceptual to the Econometric
Each of the conceptual views just discussed hasimplications for how
one would approach observed union/nonunion differenceseconometrically.
The preunion characteristics perspective wouldpush us toward searching
for observed or unobserved differences which existed betweenindividuals or
firms before they were unionized. Alternatively, theprice—theoretic view would
lead us toward searching for important price—theoretic stimulior responses which had
not been captured by our models or with our data and which could becausing the
estimated union/nonunion differences. Finally, the institutionalresponse framework
would encourage us to seek important institutional factors with thepotential to
explain estimated union impacts not explicable in terms of measurableprice—
theoretic variables. This section provides a general nontechnicalsummary of
the potential econometric issues which arise inempirical work on unions and
the ways the issues are approachea.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the econometric
problems of concern occur because the observed union/nonunion differences
—28—do not ëome from the "ideal" experimentneeded to estimate the effects of
unions (at this point in time) on economicoutcomes. This experiment would
involve unionizing a randomly chosen nonunionindividual 6r firm, while
holding all else of relevance in the world fixed, andobserving the
resultant changes.
Unfortunately, most of the statistical "experiments"we conduct depart
from the ideal for two reasons.First, we cannot hold all the relevant
factors perfectly fixed when wecompare unionized individuals, or firms to
themselves when they were nonunion. Second, it isunlikely that individuals or
firms with similar measured characteristics became unionizedon a random basis.
Potential Econometric Explanations and Assessmentsof Their Validity
The real reason you have obtained those union/nonunion
differences is that you have omitted (niismeasured,not
observed) a key variable which is correlated with union-
ization, and that variable is .
Butyou have the wrong causality. It is not that union-
ism causes .. .; itis that ... causesunionism.
It seems obvious that your results are due toselectivity;
there is an unobserved factor out there which affects




There arethree key econometric problems thatcan arise. ii doing empirical
workon the impact of unionism (or any factor) on economicoutcomes:
omitted,mismeasured, or unobserved variable bias; simultaneousequations
bias; and sample selection bias. Each. of thesepotential reasons why esti-
mated union/nonunion differences might bespurious arises because of the
aforementioned lack of an ideal experiment.
—29—These potential problems have been appealed to in attempts to explain
the observed union/nonunion differentials depicted in Table 1. Those
whose priors come from the preunion characteristics view have used the
three potential forms of bias to argue that the observed differentials in
Table 1 are illusions. Those whose priors are based on the price—theoretic
view have used the biases to offer econometric explanations of union/
nonunion differentials observed after measurable price—theoretic effects
have been netted out. In contrast, those in the institutional response
camp tend to believe that the observed relationships between unionism and
other variables are real and merit further investigation concerning their
existence and locus across specified institutional settings.
Thereare various methods for dealing with each of the potential bias
problemswhich arise in analyses of cross—sectional data. Heuristically,
these methods can be divided into three broad categories:(1) Approaches
which probe the cross—sectionairesults through various formsof Usensitiljjty!!
analysis designed to see how results might be "driven" by the poor quality
of the experiment. In this category we include such techniques as: expanding
the list of controls, using the omitted variable bias formula, imposing
coefficients on mismeasured variables, and using the variance/covariance
matrixof coefficients to examine the sensitivity of results to alleged
experimentalproblems. Given outside information on, for example, the
relationship between the omittedvariable and included variables or on
the degree of measurement eror in the variables of concern or on the likely
magnitude of selected coefficients, estimates can be made of the likely
impact of omitted, mismeasured, or unobserved variables. By making
—30—particularly strong assumptions or picking particularly large (or small) values
of the relevant correlation coefficients, one can "stack the deckt' against the
estimated union effect and thus get a good notion of its strength.(2) Tech-
niques which seek to treat the alleged experimental problem through complex
systems of equations in which both the relevant variables and/or their exact
functional form are used to identify the "true" union impact. Such techniques
can be used to deal with unobserved or mismeasured variables but are most commonly
used to treat the simultaneous equations and sample selection problems. The
methodology is to postulate a "true" model which enables one to deal with
thealleged experimental problem and to solve the resultant equations to obtain
the coefficient of concern.(3)Approacheswhich seek to obtain new and better
qualitydata designed specifically to deal with particular experimental problems,
especially measurement error andomitted variables.
A very different approach to the three types of problems described is
to apply a different experimental design to the problem of estimating union
effects by examining longitudinal (before/after) rather than cross—sectional
data. Longitudinal information provides what is perhaps the most direct way
of dealing with the essential cross—sectional data problem ——thatwe are
comparing different people or firms rather than conducting the ideal experiment
described earlier. If one obtains longitudinal data in which omitted, mis—
measured, or unobserved variables are constant over time, one can obtain
estimates of union effects purged of biases due to these problems. Similarly,
by enabling us to compare outcome variables before and after unionization,such
data provide the proper recursive structure for dealing withboththe "union
causes"versus "causes fljQflj5tquestionand the problem of cross—sectional
selectivity bias.
Itis importantto recognize, however, that longitudinal studies are
themselvessubject to potential experimental problems not unlike those with
cross—sectional data. One potential difficulty is that when persons change jobs,
—31—other relevant variables are also likely to change, such as occupation orindustry
or tasks at work, which may be omitted, mismeasured, or unobserved in the
analysis. Another potential problem is that classical measurement error bias
may become more severe because the systematic parts of variables are
differenced away. Third, since only a limited number of persons are likely
to change union status in a given period of time, longitudinal studies may
be prone to a sample selection problem not unlike that in cross—sectional
studies. Longitudinal calculations reveal the effects of changing union
status on the position of workers who change: if those persons differ in
some fundamental way from other workers, the results may not generalize to
the entire population. Whether the selectivity of union and nonunion
changers is an important phenomenon and, if so, in what way it affects
results are unclearapriori.5
• Recognizing the problems of longitudinal analyses does not of course
vitiate the fact that before/after data provide a distinct and real set of
potential experiments which can go a long way toward dealing with the potential
difficulties with cross—sectional work discussed above. By following the same
individual or firm over time as it changes status from nonunion to union or
vice versa, one is able to control in a more natural way for all missing or
unobserved variables which do not change over time. The longitudinal data
are an invaluable complementary form of information to the more widely used
cross—sectional data.
III. Illusion or Reality? Econometric Probes
Much recent work on unionism has used the econometric techniques
alluded to earlier to probe the union/nonunion differentials summarized in
Table 1. What have been the results of these efforts to obtain better
—32—estimates of the "true" union effect on economic outcomes? To what extent
are the Table 1 differences "moved" by sensitivity probes which use new data
or information to evaluate the effect of omitted, mismeasured,or unobserved
variables in a specified study? How sensitive are the thupirical results to
probes which rely on extensive cross—sectional modeling in which unionization
is taken as endogenous, for reasons of either simultaneity or selectivity?
What are the results of panel or longitudinal studies designed to deal with
the potential "experimental" problems with cross—sectional studies? In short, what
does the evidence say about possible ways of answering, and about possible
answers to, the frequently heard seminar assertions regarding the potential
problems with the cross—sectional analyses of the impact of collective
bargaining?
In this section we review the relevant econometric studies which address
these important questions. Our review yields the following two key con-
clusions. First, the econometric probes do not invalidate the findings summarized
in Table 1 by attributing all or the vast bulk of observed differences to
the inadequacies of the experimental comparisons. Studies which probe the
sensitivity of cross—sectional findings to omitted, mismeasured or unobserved
variables show that while these experimental problems appear to bias union
coefficients somewhat, they are far from the sole explanation of the ordinary
least squares regression results. Studies which use longitudinal data to
deal with the problems of unobserved factors, simultaneity, orsample
selectivity tend to yield lower estimates of union effects than do OLS
studies using cross sectional information, but they also fai1 to. eliminate the
—33—bulk of estimated impacts. Studies which seek additional data regarding the
potential causality of union effects through surveys of firms also tend to
find real union impacts on behavior.
Second, studies which use systems of equations with cross—sectional data
to "correct for" potential simultaneous equations and sample selection bias
provide very little insight into whether the Table 1 union/nonunion differences
are real or illusory. The models employed rely on "restrictions" or
"exclusions" which are far from convincing. Moreover, the results show great
instability in the face of seemingly small changes in the model or the sample
analyzed. In some cases these techniques yield union effects much below
those obtained with OLS; in others they yield effects much above those from
OLS; in yet others the systems of equations give about the same results as does
OLS. In a surprisingly large number of cases, these techniques yield results
so implausible on a priori grounds as to be dismissed out of hand. While
this instability and implausibility does not demonstrate that the OLS union/
nonunion differences are unbiased, itdoes indicate that the system of
equations methodology does nOt offer a reliable and useful way of improving
on these estimates.
We consider next the evidence regarding these two conclusions. We
review first the results of efforts to probe cross—sectional findings
with sensitivity analysis, better data designed to deal woth omitted
variables, and systems techniques. Then we review the growing body of
evidence which uses longitudinal experiments to check on the
cross—sectional findings.
—34—Probing the Cross—Sectional Evidence
Table 3 summarizes some recent efforts to assess the validity of cross—
sectional findings using one or more of the methods discussed in the preceding
section. For each study the table shows: the type of bias being focused on,
the econometric technique employed, the variable analyzed, the data used, the
key empirical results, and the appropriate references. While our listing is
undoubtedly incomplete, we believe it is broadly representative of the pattern
of results in extant work. Because of the initial concentration of quantitative
analyses on wages, the table is top heavy with the results of econometric
probes into the union wage effect.
The first and undoubtedly the most widely used technique for dealing with
data inadequacies is to test the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of
detailed industry or occupation controls in the data set under study.
Addition of such controls in some sense leads to finer experiments by
focusing on union effects within more detailed groupings. Alternatively, to
the extent that missing or mismeasured variables differ across the relevant
sectors, inclusion of a large number of variables can be justified by
pointing out that they help control for those variables. Even when one
might argue that exclusion of detailed controls is theoretically "correct,"
it is useful to know whether these variables "matter." In many studies attempts
are made to obtain information on the posited missing variables at an
industry level and to add those variables in place of the dummy controls. This
provides a means of evaluating what industry dummies in fact stand for, but



















Addition of various dummies for
2— and where possible 3—digit
Census or SIC industry or for
etc. occupation can reduce but not
eliminate estimated union!
floflufliofl differential; similar
results from adding average
characteristics using industry
figures and from adding vari-
ables capturing workplace
characteristics.
Union coefficient is reduced
substantially by forcing esti-
mated coefficient of capital!
labor variable to equal an
upper bound of capital's
share of value added in
Census of Manufactures data
set, but still implies that
unionized estalishments are
moderately more productive
(by a lower bound of 6%).
Correcting for omitted fringe
benefits variable and mis—
measuredalternate earnings
variablecan most likely
reduce large union coefficient
by no more than 1/4.
Capturing true labor quality is
unlikely to greatly reduce the
union productivity effect in
cement.
Physical output data for cement
plants and coal mines obtained
to deal with problems of dis-
tinguishing output variation
from price variation indicate
that the fact that the earlier
union productivity studies used
a value measure cannot explain
the estimated positive union
effect; in addition, these data
point to the importance of the
quality of labor—management re-






PROBES INTO UNION/NONUNION DIFFERENCES USINGCROSS-SECTIONAL DATAa














































EVIDENCE OF ECONOMETRIC PROBES INTO UNION/NONUNION DIFFERENCES USING CROSS-SECTIONAL DATAa























Union/nonunion differences in the
relationships between seniority
and both terminations and promo-
tions cannot be explained in
terms of an unobserved union!
nonunion differential in the re-
lationship between seniority and
contribution to firm.
Magnitude of union coefficient
i sensitive to precise modej
for unobserved establishment
characteristics, but qualitative
conclusion that unions are asso-
ciated with higher fringe
benefits is not.
Union/nonunion wage differential
declines for 49 manufacturing
industries from 37% with OLS to
27% in a 2—SLS model.
Union/nonunion wage differential
declines for 2—digit SIC manu-
facturing industries from 46% OLS
to 19% or 4% in 2—SLS models and
to —9% in a 3—SLS model.
Both wage and quit differentials
grow substantially (in absolute
value) with data for 3—digit SIC
manufacturing industries, when
2—SLS replaces OLS; the wage
differential rises from 50 to 80%.
Wage differential reduced from 11%
to 6% by fitting a system of equa-
tions in which the estimated union
coefficientbis unbiased by
assumption.
Wage differential rises with
selectivity correction from 32%
to 51%; differential in quit







union differential rises from 22/
38% to 28/105% for young and
,nidd1e—aged black employees and
from 25/13% to 37/46% for young

































EVIDENCE OF ECONOMETRIC PROBES INTO UNION/NONUNION DIFFERENCES USING CROSS—SECTIONAL DATAa
ll workers
Sample Selection Bias Wages
Add an inverse Mills
ratio term to outcome
equation or estimate




Results vary with data set and
model, with estimated differenti-
als moving, in many cases quite
substantially, in both directions
(presented in Table 4).
Coefficients in separate
union andnonunionequations
are only moderately affected














Estimated union wage differ-
ential rises significantly
to 40% from its OLS value
of 13% in one calculation
and modestly in another





Results vary with data set
and model with estimated dif-
ferentials moving, in many
cases quite substantially,
in both directions to large
positive or large (in absolute













Sizeable increases in wage dif—
ferential for nurses aides (to
89%); moderate increases for
health aides and technical














rSlD; ich±gr Time Use Survey
Differential increases from
19% to 24% with union made




























Union coefficient in wage
equation goes from insignificant












Percentage reduction in turnover
associated with unionism is large




Notes: aThefollowing abbreviations are used throughout this table and the remainder of
the paper for data sources: CPS represents the Current Population Survey, E&E re-
presents Employment and Earnings, EEC represents the Expenditure for Employee Compen-
sation survey., NLS represents the National Longitudinal Survey PSID epreseflts
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics survey., and SEO represents the Survey of Eco-
nomic Opportunity, and for statisticaL techniques: OLS represents ordinary least
squares, 2—SLS represents two—stage least squares, and 3—SLS represents three—stage
least squares.
bThis result is reported in the Schmidtresponse to Olsents piece, which pointed
out a flaw in the original Schmidt & Strauss model.
—39—In most cases in which additional controls are added to analyses,
either by augmentation of data sets with industry—level variables or byinclusion
of numerous industry or 'occupation dummy variables, the greater refinement
of the comparison set reduces the estimated impact of unionism. But this
occurs only up to the point of, say 1— or 2—digit industry or occupation
controls. Additional controls appear to have only a modest effect on
the estimates. Consider, for example, the effect of adding industry
controls to the equations estimating the effect of unionism on the usual
hourly pay of private, male wage and salary workers using 1976 May CPS data. With
a standard log—linear hourly earnings functional form which includes race, years of
education, age minus years of education minus six and its square, three region
dummies, and ablue—collar dummy variable, the effect of adding industry
controls on the estimated coefficient of the union membership dummy (member
=1)is shown below.
Industry Controls Estimated Union Member Coefficient







2—digit Census (45) .19
(.01)
3—digit Census (200) .18
(.01)
\
Asis common in such sensitivity probes, the reductions (in absolute value)
in union coefficients approach zero very quickly as the number of industry
dummies grows, and the estimated union/nonunion difference of concern does
not vanish.
—40—Addition of other variables designed to reflect union/nonunion
comparisons by holding fixed work place conditions likely to cause
compensating differentials yields similar results: union/nonunion wage
differentials diminish but do not disappear. The most sizeable reduction,
obtained by Duncan and Stafford (1980), showed that addition of variables
relating to the nature and intensity of work to a ln (wage) equation reduced
a union coefficient estimate of .29 to .19. Other studies by Brown (1980)
and Leigh (1981), however, show no such relation between union/nonunion
differentials and characteristics of work places.
There have been a limited number of studies which have sought to
evaluate the effect of measurement error or omitted variableson estimated
union/nonunion differentials. In their study of productivity, Brown and
Medoff (1978) probed the extent to which the coefficient on unionism could
be explained by classical measurement error in the capital/labor ratio by
exploiting the fact that with the Cobb—Douglas production function, under
profit maximization, the coefficient of this ratio should equal capital's
share of value added. Because the OLS estimate of the coefficient was
below capital's share and because unionization and capital/labor ratio are
positively correlated, they found that mismeasurement of the capital
intensity variable may have substantially biased upward the estimated impact
of unionism on productivity. However, even when the coefficient of the
capital/labor variable was forced to equal an upper bound estimate of
capital's share, there remained a nonnegligible positive union productivity
effect. In a study of quits, Freeman (l980a, 1980b) used the omitted
variable bias formula to assess the sensitivity of the apparent union effect
on quits to the omission of fringe benefits from the analysis and to
—41—measurement error in alternative wages. The formula was applied using
information from other data sets in conjunction with strong assumptions
designed to yield lower bound estimates of the union effect. The lower
bound estimates showed a significant and large effect about half as
large as the initial OLS impact. In another study, dealing with omitted
variables, Clark (1980a, 1980b) examined the likely effect of omitted labor
quality on the union/nonunion productivity differential. Using a formula
describing how labor quality enters the production process, and exogenous
information on possible quality changes during the period since his sample
of cement plants had gone from nonunion to union, he concluded that only a
small piece of the differential he had originally estimated could be
explained by this uncaptured work force dimension.
There have been some recent efforts to generate new data sets to deal
othitted oTinismeasured variáble problems. To determine whether union
effects on productivity, measured by value added, might be due to union
effects on the price rather than the output component of value added, Connerton,
Freeman, and Nedoff gathered data on tons of coal, while Clark gathered
data on tons of cement. The coal study found sizable positive union
productivity effects when industrial relations in the sector were good but
negative effects in a period of poor industrial relations. The cement
study found positive union effects on physical output per worker in that
industry. To determine whether union/nonunion differentials in the extent
to which seniority reduces the probability of termination and increases the
chance of promotion could be explained by an unobserved union/nonunion
differential in the relationships between company service and current contri-
bution, Nedoff and Abraham (1981b) asked companies to compare the termination
—42—and promotion probabilities of senior and junior employees whose performance
was equal. Based on 561 responses, it was concluded that the greater importance
attached to seniority per se under unionism could not be explained in terms
of an uncaptured differential in the way performance and seniority were
related.
Finally, the recently developed unobservablestt models (see Chamberlain
(1977)) were used by Freeman (1981) to assess the possibility that part of the
estimated unton impact on fringes was due to an omitted firm characteristic. The
analysis showed that the extent to which the OLS differential could be
attributed to unobserved firm differences depended greatly on theway the
model was constructed. When it was assumed that there was no within—firm
spillover from blue—collar unionization to white—collar fringes, the original
fringe differential was reduced substantially by the firm—effects correction.
However, when a within—firm spillover was allowed, which seems to be the
more reasonable assumption, the original differential was not lowered by
the correction. Hence, any conclusion concerning the impact of unobserved
firm effects on the union/nonunion fringe differential depends crucially on
one's a priori logic concerning the "true" unobservable model to be used.
Simultaneous Equations
Several analysts have sought to explore the causality of observed
union effects using simultaneous equations models in which unionism is endo—
genous, i.e., determined by the equations in the system. In the outcome equa-
tion(s) the actual union variable is replaced by a predicted variable.
Identification of the system is obtained either by exclusion of one (or
more) variables from the outcome equation, but not from the unionism
-43-equation, or on the basis of different functional forms for the two equations.
The first analyses using the simultaneous equations technique focused
on industry aggregates. Both Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) and Pencavel
(1970) showed that, depending on the particular model employed, a large
positive OLS union/nonunion wage differential in U.S. manufacturing was
substantially reduced; Ashenfelter and Johnson estimated a differential of 46 per-
cent with a single equation (OLS) model, a differential of 19 percent with
one two—stage model, a differential of 4 percent with another two—stage
model, and a differential of —8 percent with a three—stage model. The more
recent work on manufacturing by Kahn (1977), who used 3-digit SIC data,
whereas the previous researchers used 2—digit data, but followed the same
general procedure, generated quite different results: substantial increases
(in absolute value) in both the union wage and quit effects upon correcting
for the endogeneity of unionism. Kahn's estimated wage differential rose
from 50 to 80 percent when he changed his technique from OLS to two—stage
least squares and his estimated quit effect also rose noticeably. Hence,
seemingly small changes in the models employed and in the degree of data
aggregation have yielded very different results with systems designed to
correct for potential simultaneous equations bias in analyses of aggregate
cross—sectional data.
A widely divergent pattern of results has also been obtained when roughly
similar simultaneous equations madeIs hav been estimated with similar bodies
of individual—level data. Schmidt (1978), relying on functional form for
identification, reported a decline in the effect of unionism fromlOpercent
to 4 percent with SEU data (his two equation model was not, however,
-44-needed to obtain unbiased estimates, since it assumedaway the correlation
that gives rise to the bias problem). On the other hand, Duncan and
Stafford (1980) showed an increase in the estimated coefficient of unionism
when unionism was made endogenous in their model which focusedon work
conditions, as did Leigh (1980a). Applying a simultaneous equations
model with both a wage and a quit equation' to theyoung men NLS data,
Farber (1979) obtained an increase in the union wage effect while at the
same time switching the sign on the standard quit effect from negative to
positive, the opposite of Kahn's quit result. Farber found his results
somewhat puzzling. Overall, in the regressions cited in Table 3 (including
those from Cain, et al. presented in detail in Table 4), there is an
alarming amount and pattern of instability when actual unionism is replaced
by predicted unionism; in somewhat more than half the cases, the estimated
union coefficient rises, counter to expectation, often to rather large
values, while in many cases in which the coefficient declines it becomes
negative.
While most authors have not discussed the sensitivity of their findings
to minor changes in specification, the statements of those who have indicate
that the instability discussed above is not a purely cross—researcher
phenomenom, since a given individual working with a given data set appears
likely to find that slight changes in specification lead to large changes in
results. For example, Duncan and Stafford(1980, p. 367) wrote that "the
estimated union coefficient [is] sensitive to the exogenous variables omitted
from the [wage] equation." Similarly, Mitchell (1980, p. 204) stated: "In
general simultaneous—equation estimates require assumptions concerning which
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RESULTS OF "WISCONSIN" REGRESSIONS WITH CPS DATA IN WHICH UNIONISM IS TREATED AS A PREDICTED
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE OR IN WHICHTHEREIS A SAMPLE SELECTION TERN
)tes:
aThese differentials give the estimated percentage amount by which thewages of union mem-
bers exceed those of otherwise comparable nonunion employees. Although the data were
transformed where necessary to yield differentials, the original t—statistic or level of
significance (depending on what the author presented) is given.
bme data set used to derive these estimates isa pooled file of 1973—1976 Nay CPS micro—
data. The dependent variable for each occupational group in the particular government!
nongovernment sector was the real hourly wage rates of individual hospital workers. Re-
gressors in the OLS Union Effect model included a zero—one union status dummy variable as
well as a vector of personal characteristics, region of country, size of SNSA, year, and
sub—occupation group. In the Union—Effect—With—Predicted—Unionism model, predicted union
status (provided by a probit computation) replaced the zero—one union status variable. In
the Union—Effect—With—Inverse—Mills—Ratio model, the hazard ratio was added as a regressor
to the OLS Union Effect model. Interactions of the union status dummy variable with vari-
ables for race, year, and full—time/part—time status were included in each model. The
significance level refers to the combined effect of the set of union and union—interaction
variables.
CThe data set used and the variables included in the models are essentially the same as in note
b above, except that part—time workers were excluded. The only important difference in
the specification is that interactions terms were not included as additional regressors in
the McLaughlin regressions. In fact, the McLaughlin results are virtually identical to
the Cain, et al. specifications without the interaction terms.
dThe data set usedwas the March, 1971 CPS. The dependent variable in these regressions
is the log of annual earnings of full—time, full—year, nonfarrn, private sector production
workers. In addition to a zero—one union status dummy variable and a percent—of—industry
unionized variable, regressors included a vector of personal characteristics, region
of country, size of SNSA, industry, and industrial concentration.
—47—Experiments by this author suggest that changing assumptions can produce
wide variations in results ranging from negative union wage effects to
ridiculously large positive effects.1'
Perhaps the most far reaching work on the stability of models which
replace a union variable by a predicted value, in the context of a model in
which unionism is taken as endogenous, has been done at the University of
Wisconsin by Cain; et al. (1980), McLaughlin (1980), and Podgursky (1980).
Their findings for the wage differential, summarized in Table 4, show that
the same simultaneous equations model, estimated with data for comparable
employee groups, yields results which swing back and forth over a highly
implausible range (from —84 percent to 95 percent).6 The Podgursky results,
which show the union/nonunion wage differential swinging from a positive 10
percent with OLS to a most certainly absurd negative 72 percent using a
two—stage least squares procedure, are particularly striking as they relate
.;to one of the groups most frequently studied in the literature.
We conclude that the highly sensitive results obtained with both aggre-
gate industry and individual—level data sets when unionism is "predicted" raise
serious questions about the usefulness of the simultaneous equation methodology
for analyses of what unions really do. The technique appears to be trying
to squeeze out of the data more than the data contain; it does not, in our
view, provide a reliable way of addressing the illusion/reality question.
SampleSelection
Therecently popular technique for dealing with potential sample
—48—selection bias——adding an inverse Millsratio term to oucoie regressions,
which corrects for the potential bias under certain assumptions (see Heckman
l976)——has been used in a number of analyses of the union/nonunion wage dif-
ferential. In the first such piece, Lee (1978), using exclusion of variables
as well as functional form for identification, reduced slightly the OLS wage
differential for operatives (from 17 to 16 percent) with data from the SEO.
Leigh (1980b), fitting models very similar to those used by Lee,
analyzed NLS data for both older and younger men. He found that wage dif-
ferentials were increased, rather than decreased, by the selectivity adjustment in
both samples. In several cases they were increased by extremely large amounts;
in three of six sets he presented, the selectivity—adjusted percentages were at
least three times as large as the OLS estimates. Another very substantial
increase in estimated wage differentials was obtained by Neumann (1977);
with PSID data for 1974 his adjusted estimate was 40 percent while his OLS
estimate was 13 percent. However, when Neumann used average data for 1968—1974,
the difference was much smaller: 9 percent versus 6 percent. Overall, the
results from adding sample selectivity "correction" terms to wage regressions
appear to be as unstable and divergent as those obtained with simultaneous
equations "corrections." Studies that differ only slightly in specification,
data, or group covered show wide differences in the impact of the "corrections"
on OLS results.7
Work focusing on the wage differential in a givensector, hospitals,
also does not yield stable or seemingly plausible results. Becker (1978)
and Sloan and Elnicki (1979) found that selectivity adjustments reduced
estimated union coefficients, whereas the results in Table 4 from Cain, et al.
(1980) and McLaughlin (1980) for various groups in this sector show as many
—49—increases as decreases in the union coefficient upon addition of the inverse
Mills ratio to regressions using the same survey data and model. In yet
another study, Feldman, Lee, and Hoffman (1980) obtained increases in the
union wage effect for several occupations in the health sector but obtained
decreases in the union wage effect for nurses when they corrected for
selectivity.
Podgursky's (1980) work with the CPS files provides yet additional
evidence which calls into question the usefulness of the inverse Mills
ratio technique for analyses of union/nonunion differentials. In his
work on private sector production workers, an initial positive OLS
differential of 10 percent (significant at the .01 level) becomes a highly dubious
negative 63 percent (again significant at the .01 level) when an inverse
Mills ratio term is added to a wage equation.
What is one to make of the aberrant results obtained with the simulta-
neous equations (predicted unionism) technique and with the inverse Mills
ratio technique for examining whether observed union/nonunion differences
are real or illusory? We believe that the empirical results just presented
strongly suggest that there is little to be learned from using either of
the two techniques for analyzing the impact of unionism. Unfortunately,
there seems to be no obvious tIbestt way to identify the systems of concern
and the results obtained seem to be highly sensitive to the one chosen, as
well as to the data and sample with which it is used. While the problems
addressed by the techniques may be real, the econometric solutions offered
can do little to solve them with extant cross—sectional data. Econometric
manipulations of these data do not appear to be a good substitute for
—50—better data, for experiments more suitable to answering theproblems of
concern, or for genuine institutional or theoretical knowledge about the
interactions between union, employers, and workers.
Longitudinal data
The results of some recent studies of union effects that exploit the
before/after nature of longitudinal data sets to obtain estimates of the
effect of unionism on the same person or firm are summarized in Table 5. As
before, there are more results on wage rates than on other outcomes of concern.
The wage studies, which ask "How does thewage of a worker change when he/she
goes from union to nonunion status or vice versa?". ieldestimates of union
wage effects which, while lower than those obtained in comparable
cross—sectional analyses, are of sizeable and significant magnitude
supporting the claim that unionism does indeed raise the wages of individuals.
In contrast to the attempts to deal with the problem of causality and
selectivity with systems of equations, in no case does a longitudinal
analysis result "blow up."
The magnitude of the difference between longitudinal and cross—sectional
estimates of union wage effects varies somewhat by study. Chamberlain found that
the effect of unionism estimated with the longitudinal data in the young men
NLS was about six—tenths as large as the effect estimated with cross—sectional data.
Mincer found the longitudinal effect roughly two—thirds as large as the
cross—sectional effect. Mellow's analysis of the Nay—Nay matched CPS tapes,
by contrast, obtained a longitudinal effect that was about 40 percent of
that estimated in CPS cross—sectional regressions. One possible explanation
of the greater difference between the CPS results and other results is
—51—that in the CPS, unlike in the other surveys, workers do not typically
respond for themselves, raising the possibility of greater measurement
error in the union variable using the CPS than using the other surveys. As
noted earlier, classical measurement error can be expected to become a more
serious problem in longitudinal than in cross—sectional data. Finally, with
respect to wages, Duncan and Stafford and Leigh have presented figures on
the change in wages for workers who switch union status and those who
remain union or nonunion. These figures, given in Table 5, provide several
interesting comparisons which illuminate the nature of the longitudinal
experiment. From them one can compare the wage changes of workers who were
nonunion in the first period and became union members in the second period
to the wage changes of workers who were nonunion in both periods or to the
changes of those who began as members but left their unions or to the
changes of workers who were unionized in both periods. A similar set of
comparisons can also be made for workers who began as union members but
left their union. Each comparison provides an answer to a different question
concerning the impact of unionism on wage rates. For present purposes,
it suffices to note that in all relevant comparisons, the results in Table 5
show a substantial union wage impact of a magnitude somewhat smaller than,
but consistent with, the Table 1 findings.
Longitudinal data have also been used to study the union effect on
quits, productivity, and work conditions. With respect to quits and producti-
vity, the results confirm the cross—sectional findings. Longitudinal
analysjs of quit behavior in a pooled PSID sample yields estimated coeffi-
cients on the union variable roughly equal to those obtained in cross—sectional
analyses, indicating that the lower quits of union workers cannot be explained
—52—TABLE 5
EVIDENCE OF ECONOMETRIC PROBES iNTO UNION/NONUNION DIFFERENCES
USING LONGITUDINAL DATA
VARIABLE,
DATA SET, RESULT REFERENCE
SA}iP LE
Wages Changes in wages from going union to non— Chamberlain (1980)
union (UN) as opposedto remaining union
NLS Young Men (UU) and of going nonunion to union (NU) as
opposed to remaining nonunion (NN) are about
All workers six—tenths as large as the comparable
cross—sectional differentials.
Productivity NU change is roughly the same Clark (1980a, 1980b)
as the comparable cross—sectional
Cement company data differential.
Production workers
Wages; Work Condi— Change in wages: Duncan & Stafford
tions UN7%;:NU55%; (1980)
UU 33%;NN 4O%. -
PSID;Michigan Time Estimated UN change in "choice of work"
Use Survey is positive while NO change is negative.
Estimated UN changes in "freedom to
All workers increase work hours" is near zero while
NU change is negative and substantially
so in absolute value.
Quits Quit differential in longitudinal Freeman (l978b)
study is roughly the same as in
PSID comparable cross—sectional studies.
All workers
Wages; Work Change in wages: Leigh (1980a)
Conditions UN 45%;NU118%;
IJU 71%; NN 81%.
NLS Young Men Estimated UN change in 'progress at work"
is positive while NO change is negative.
All workers Estimated UN change in "job pressures"
is negative while NO change is positive.
Estimated UN change in "job pace" is




DATA SET, RESULT REFERENCE
SANPLE
Wages Wage differential of about Mellow (1979)
8% in longitudinal analysis
May CPS compared to 19% in cross—
sectional analysis.
All workers
Wages UN and NU changes are about Mincer (1980)
two—thirds as large as the comparable
PSID; NLS cross—sectional differential.
Men
—54—by an unobservable variable labeled "innate propensity to quit.?' With
regard to productivity, Clark (1980a) found only a modest diminution in
his estimated effect of unionism on productivity in the cement industry
when he went to a before/after sample.8 With respect to work conditions,
the results are somewhat less clear. Duncan and Stafford (1980) found a
decline (increase) in the quality of certain work conditions when workers
joined (left) unions in the PSID whereas Leigh (1980a) found no such
effects in the NLS.
Overall, the longitudinal analyses suggest that much of the cross—
sectional union/nonunion differentials presented in Table 1 are real rather
than illusory. Since, as noted earlier, it is likely that there are some
potential problems with analyses which estimate union impacts by focusing
on marginal as opposed to average workers, we endorse neither the longitudinal
noz the crs—sectjona1 results as the answer. However, the fact that
they regularly point in the same direction is reassuring.
IV. Concl.usion
This paper has reviewed a significant body of evidence regarding the
impact of trade unionism on economic performance and sought to evaluate
antithetical views regarding whether estimated differences between union and
nonunion workers and firms represent: illusions created by poor experiments, real
effects explicable solely in price—theoretic terms, or real effects which
reflecttha nonwage—related dimensions of trade unions. The review has
yielded conclusions on both the substantive questions at hand and the
methodologies which have been used to address their validity.
—55—With respect to the illusion/reality debate, thepreponderance of
evidence indicates that union effects on a widevariety of economic
variables estimated with cross—sectional data are real. Diverse
econometric probes into these findings and examination of longitudinal
as well as cross—sectional data have supported the reality of the union
impact on economic performance. While magnitudes of coefficients have
been altered by the probes, in almost no case has the evidence beenexplained
away as due solely to the poor quality of the relevant econometric experi-
ments. Moreover, since the effects of unions onnonwage outcomes generally
come from models which hold fixed the level of wages and variables affected
by wages, the evidence supports the view that unions do much more than
simply raise wages as an economic monopolist. While,.. in this study, we have
not examined interpretations at these nonwage effects, the effectsrepresent
an empirical foundation for the institutional view of unionism described in
Section I.
With respect to methods for evaluating the quality of standardcross—
sectional experiments, some techniques appear more useful than others. In
particular, we have found that sensitivity analyses of single—equation
results and longitudinal experiments provide valuable checkson cross—
sectional findings while multiple—equations approaches; produce results which
are much too unstable to help resolve the questions of concern.
Our conclusions seem to have three messages for future research on
trade unionism. First, the operating assumption that trade unions have
important and real wage and nonwage effects is strongly supported by the
extant evidence. Second, the search for a valid answer to the question of
—56—what unions do should involve more than just manipulating existing data
with sophisticated techniques; it should have at its heart the collection
of new evidence concerning the functions and operations of trade unions
and their interactions with firms and employees. Third, the illusion!
reality question should be asked not only of empirical results on the impact
of collective bargaining, but also of the efforts used to probe these
findings.
—57—Footnotes
'Those who hold this viewgenerally also explicitly or implicitly assume
that there are no quasi—rents due to cost advantages unassociated with
unionization, as discussed at greater length on p. 19 below.
2See Freeman and Medoff (1979).
related possibility is that unions organize enough new firms in a competi—
tive industry to offset the demise of existing firms whose costs were raised
by unionism. In this scenario, the relevant capital market condition is
that firms earn a normal expected rate of return over their lifetimes.
4We ignore the case of an infinite elasticity of substitution between labor
and other factors, since this would imply that we would not observe union-
ized work forces to compare with those which are nonunion.
5
Several arguments can be advanced regarding the possible problems involved
in infering union effects for the population from what happens to a sample
of changers. To see the first, consider wages. To the extent that
voluntary job changing is viewed as an investment in mobility, there is
likely to be a tendency for both union and nonunion job changers to
experience the same percentage wage gains, as both would change only if
they could earn the appropriate return. This would bias comparisons of the
differences in the wage growth of union—to—nonunion and nonunion—to--union
changers toward zero. One would most likely get better estimates by
looking solely at changers who left their firm involuntarily for reasons
unrelated to their individual actions (e.g., those whose firms went out
of business). Another point is that observed wage changes of union—status
changers depend on where the changers fell in the relevant wage distribu—
tion. If union or nonunion changers came disproportionately from either
end of the distribution of concern, the estimated wages changes would not
reflect the overall mean differential.
6Specifically, counting the number of cases in Tables 3 and 4 in which actual
unionism was replaced by predicted unionism shows eight instances in which
union coefficients declinedfrom0LS levels, four to negative values, and
twelve in which the coefficient rose compared to OLS values, five of which
reached levels in excess of 40 percent.
7Specifically, counting the number of cases in Tables 3 and 4 in which a
selectivity correction term was introduced shows ten instances in which
union coefficients declined frcin OLS levels, six to negative values, and
eleven in which the coefficients rose compared to OLS values, two of which
reached levels in excess of 40 percent.
8Brown and Medoffgathered data by 2—digit industry for 1929 and 1953 to
use with data on unionization in these two years found in Lewis (1963,pp.
289—290) in an eUort to capture. productivity before and after unionization.
They regressed the change in in (value added/labor) on the change in in
(capital/labor) and the change in fractionunionized. With only 20
—58—observations they could not estimate the unionproductivity effect with
any precision. The estimated coefficient on the change in fraction—
unionized variable ranged from negative to positivedepending on the data
used and the assumptions made.
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